A myth has arisen concerning Turing's paper of 1936, namely that Turing set forth a fundamental principle concerning the limits of what can be computed by machine -a myth that has passed into cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, to wide and pernicious effect. This supposed principle, sometimes incorrectly termed the 'Church-Turing thesis', is the claim that the class of functions that can be computed by machines is identical to the class of functions that can be computed by Turing machines. In point of fact Turing himself nowhere endorses, nor even states, this claim (nor does Church). I describe a number of notional machines, both analogue and digital, that can compute more than a universal Turing machine. These machines are exemplars of the class of nonclassical computing machines. Nothing known at present rules out the possibility that machines in this class will one day be built, nor that the brain itself is such a machine. These theoretical considerations undercut a number of foundational arguments that are commonly rehearsed in cognitive science, and gesture towards a new class of cognitive models. 
the number can be expressed by means of a certain finite string of symbols, namely a string of symbols which, if inscribed on the otherwise blank tape of some universal Turing machine, will cause the machine to churn out the decimal representation of the number. If 'computable' is to mean 'machine-computable' then it is by no means obvious that the only computable numbers are those that are computable in Turing's sense. For why should a necessary condition for the computability of a number by some machine or other be that the number is expressible in a finite number of symbols in this notation of Turing's? Indeed, I shall shortly be giving some toy examples of idealised computing machines that compute numbers and functions that are not Turing-machine-computable. Even a Turing machine can be modified to compute such numbers, simply by lifting the restriction that the input must consist of a finite number of symbols. Let x and y be two numbers that are not Turing-machinecomputable and let M be a Turing machine whose tape is infinite in one direction only. The first digit of the decimal representation of x appears on the first square of M's tape, the first digit of the representation of y appears on the second square, the third square is blank, the second digit of x's representation is on the fourth square and of y's on the fifth square, the sixth square is blank, and so on. When the machine is set in motion it invokes the left-to-right addition procedure previously mentioned, writing the resulting digits on the blank squares of the tape. Equivalently one may consider a Turing machine that has been modified by the addition of two input lines (see Turing 1948: 17ff, Copeland and Proudfoot 1996) . This arrangement removes the need to inscribe the representations of x and y on the tape prior to the commencement of the computation. If a digit is applied to an input line (e.g. in the form of an electrical pulse) this results in the digit being inscribed on the tape in a square associated with this input line (the inscription resulting from the immediately preceding input on this line is overwritten). At the first step of the computation the first digit of the representation of x is applied to the first input line and the first digit of the representation of y to the second input line; and so on. In either case M does compute the output on the basis of the input, for M performs a sequence of primitive Turing-machine operations under the control of a program, and this is the paradigm example of what it is for a machine to compute. Yet the number whose decimal representation M is engaged in churning out, x+y, is not a computable number in Turing's sense.
In the literature the word 'algorithm' is rarely used in the way in which it is used here.
Standardly, 'algorithm' is used as a synonym for 'effective procedure' (see, for example, the glossary in Minsky 1967: 311), there being no accepted term for machine-executable procedures that are not effective (i.e. which cannot also be carried out by an obedient human clerk who is devoid of any imagination or talent and is unaided by any machinery save paper and pencil). No doubt part of the explanation for this lack is that the existence of such procedures has commonly been overlooked. Their existence tends to be obscured by the fact that the word 'mechanical' is standardly used as another synonym for 'effective'. (Gandy 1988 outlines the history of this use of the word 'mechanical'.) On this way of speaking, the issue of whether there are machine-executable procedures that are not effective becomes hidden, for the question 'Are there mechanical procedures that are not mechanical?' appears self-answering. A further reason to revise traditional terminology in the manner suggested here is provided by the recent emergence of the field of quantum computation. Algorithms for quantum Turing machines (Deutsch 1985, Solovay and Yao 1996) are not effective procedures, since not all the primitive operations of a quantum Turing machine can be performed by a person unaided by machinery. (While the algorithms executed by Deutsch-Solovay-Yao quantum Turing machines are not effective procedures, they are nonetheless classical algorithms in the sense of that term introduced above, since these machines compute only Computable functions. On this point I am indebted to conversations with Solovay.) As is always remarked, the concept of an effective procedure is an 'informal' one and characterisations given of it are 'vague', 'intuitive' and 'lacking in precision'. One of Turing's aims in his paper of 1936 was to present a precise concept with which the imprecise concept of an effective procedure might be replaced. Thus his famous thesis that whenever there is an effective procedure for obtaining the values of a function, the function can be computed by a Turing machine. Turing's thesis is a large, and probably true, claim, with implications concerning the limitations of the use of effective procedures, but it is a claim that says nothing about the limitations of machine computation.
Turing introduced his machines with the intention of providing an idealised description of a certain human activity, the tedious one of numerical computation, which until the advent of automatic computing machines was the occupation of many thousands of people in commerce, government, and research establishments. These human workers were called 'computers', and this is how Turing himself uses that word in his early papers. The Turing machine is a model, idealised in certain respects, of a human being engaged in computation. Turing prefaces his first description of a Turing machine with the words: 'We may compare a man in the process of computing a ... number to a machine ' (1936: 231) . Wittgenstein put this point in a striking way: 'Turing's "Machines". These machines are humans who calculate' (Wittgenstein 1980 . It is a point that Turing was to emphasise, in various forms, again and again (see further my 1997a). Of course, it was not some deficiency of imagination that led Turing to model the Turing machine on what could be achieved by a human computer. The purpose for which it was invented demanded it. Turing's aim was to show, in response to a question raised by Hilbert, that there are well-defined mathematical problems that cannot be solved by a human being working in accordance with an effective procedure. Turing's strategy was simple. First, he argued for his thesis that there are no effective procedures that Turing machines are incapable of carrying out (see especially 1936: 249-54). Second, he gave a specific example of a mathematical problem that no Turing machine can solve. He proved there can be no Turing machine that answers all questions of the form 'Does statement p follow from the Bernays-Hilbert-Ackermann axioms for first-order predicate logic? ' (1936, sect. 11 ).
I will bring this introductory section to a close with some comments on how the issue of nonclassical computation bears on the way some of the principal battle lines are currently drawn in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Johnson-Laird is surely right when he discerns three mutually exclusive positions in current thinking concerning the relationship between human mentality and computation (1987: 252) .
(1) The human brain (or, variously, mind or mindbrain) is a classical computer. Cognition is classical computation. This is the traditional computational theory of mind. There are, of course, innumerable fine-grained renderings of the theory: the brain is variously thought to be a digital computer, an analogue computer, a stored-program machine, a program-controlled machine, a massively parallel distributed processor, and so on.
(2) The cognitive activity of a human brain can be simulated perfectly by a Turing machine but (1) is false. Analogies offered in the literature include hurricanes, the motion of the planets around the sun, and the digestion of pizza. None of these phenomena is itself computational in nature yet, supposedly, all can be simulated perfectly by a Turing machine, in the sense that the machine can compute correct descriptions of such phenomena on any temporal grid. (Opinions differ among adherents of position (2) as to whether a Turing machine simulating the cognitive activity of a brain could itself properly be taken to be thinking, or whether to do so would be as foolish as supposing 'that a computer simulation of a storm will leave us all wet' (Searle 1989: 37-38) .) (3) The human brain is not a computing machine and nor can the brain's cognitive activity be simulated in its entirety by a computing machine. 3 Johnson-Laird maintains that the only alternative to these three positions is that mental processes are not 'scientifically explicable ' (1987: 252) . But if the considerations put forward here are correct there is conceptual space for two further positions.
(4) The human brain is a nonclassical computing machine.
(5) The cognitive activity of a human brain can be simulated perfectly by a nonclassical computing machine but the brain is not itself a computing machine; such simulation cannot be effected by a classical computing machine.
A prominent advocate of position (2) is Searle (see, for example, 1992: 200 ; an extended argument for this position is given in his 1997). Searle argues for (2) on the basis of a proposition that he calls 'Church's thesis' and his belief that (1) is false. In section 4 I will be maintaining that his argument is unsound, and instructively so. At this point it is worth remarking that his separate argument for the falsity of (1), the Chinese room argument, is powerless when faced with (4) . 4 This argument depends upon the occupant of the Chinese room being able in principle to 'handwork' a computer program, or in a later version, upon the occupants of the Chinese gym being able in principle to enact the steps of the algorithm that determines the behaviour of some connectionist network (Searle 1980 (Searle , 1990 . Thus in both cases the argument demands that the algorithm in question be an effective procedure. Indeed, one way of explaining the notion of an effective procedure is as a machine program that can be carried out by the clerk in the Chinese room, who works obediently but without imagination and who uses no machinery other than paper and pencil. By its nature, the argument is inapplicable to machine programs that are not effective procedures, even machine programs that, like Turing machine programs, consist of instructions to perform operations on discrete symbols. Section 3 describes a class of nonclassical machines that run such programs. First, some analogue nonclassical machines are considered.
Nonclassical Analogue Computing Machines
In analogue representation, properties of the representational medium ape (or reflect or model) and applying to i 2 whatever charge it determines must be entered into this accumulator in order to produce null charge on the output line.)
Notice that each of these nonclassical algorithms evidently meets the Kleene-Hofstadter requirement that an algorithm be capable of being 'communicated reliably from one sentient being to another of reasonable mathematical aptitude by means of language' (Kleene 1987 : 493-4, Hofstadter 1980 . (To anticipate a little, this remark applies also to algorithms executed by the nonclassical digital machines introduced in section 3.)
The action of M1 can be approximated by Turing machine, in the sense that if, for any real number x and for any integer k, some Turing machine is given the first k places of a decimal representation of x, it will compute at least the first k places of 3x. The belief is often expressed that the action of any continuous system can be approximated by a Turing machine to any required degree of fineness. Dreyfus, for example, claims that 'even an analogue computer, provided that the relation of its input to its output can be described by a precise mathematical function, can be simulated on a
[classical] digital machine ' (1992: 72) . This belief is false. Let us use as the measure of the degree of fineness of the computations the maximum number of digits d in the decimal strings employed to approximate whatever real numbers are in question (assuming for simplicity that these real numbers are always less than one). Clearly there is no d such that, for any Computable numbers x and y, a Turing machine which is given the first d digits of x's decimal representation and the first d digits of y's decimal representation will print '1' if and only if M2 prints '1'. Thus the action of M2 cannot be approximated by a Turing machine (even though the relation of M2's input to its output 'can be described by a precise mathematical function').
In conversation one sometimes encounters references to a mysterious theorem which allegedly states that the action of any analogue computer can be approximated by a Turing machine to any required degree of precision. In fact there is no such theorem in the literature. What is to be found is a theorem due to Pour-El and Shannon stating that this is so for a particular type of analogue computer, the GPAC or general-purpose analogue computer. The GPAC is an idealisation of a differential analyser (much as a Turing machine is an idealisation of a general-purpose digital computer). The first differential analyser, which was mechanical, was built in 1931 by Vannevar Bush, working at MIT (Bush 1931 (Bush , 1936 . In subsequent versions the wheel-and-disc integrators and other mechanical components were replaced by electromechanical, and finally by electronic, devices (Bush and Caldwell 1945) . A differential analyser may be conceptualised as a collection of black boxes connected together (2) the action of the GPAC can always be approximated by a Turing machine (Pour-El 1974, theorems 3 and 7). There was a crucial lacuna in the proof of Shannon's principal theorem and Pour-El is able to obtain her results only because of a significant modification she makes to Shannon's idealised machine (Pour-El 1974, notes 4 and 12). 5 In her terminology the modification is that there must exist a 'domain of generation' of the initial conditions of the machine (1974: 8, 12, and note 4) . In essence what this amounts to is that, within a given limit, small alterations in the input to, or the settings of, the machine produce no change in the output. As she says, 'In practice the operator is allowed to vary the initial conditions on an analog computer slightly ' (1974: 12) . I will call her modification to Shannon's idealisation the requirement of limited precision. When ε is the smallest number such that a given machine is able to distinguish a pair of numerical inputs that differ by that amount, ε is called the precision constant of the machine.
It is certainly the case that if an analogue computer is to be operable by a human being then it must conform to the requirement of limited precision. However, this requirement has no place in a treatment of the issue of whether there are computable functions that are not Turing-machinecomputable: computability is not an epistemic notion. Moreover, the 'insensitive dependence on initial conditions' demanded by Pour-El renders the GPAC unable to distinguish between inputs that a Turing machine can distinguish. Let x and y be distinct numbers with finite decimal representations and which differ by less than the precision constant of the GPAC. Then, tautologically, the GPAC will be unable to distinguish an input of x from an input of y. However, a Turing machine will be able to so distinguish, for if two finite strings differ a Turing machine will be able to detect the difference. The only bound placed on the length of strings input into a Turing machine is that they be finite. In other words, a Turing machine is permitted the luxury of unlimited precision in the representation of the inputs x and y (subject always to the proviso that x and y are Computable). To insist that the GPAC have a non-zero precision constant is to give it an unfair handicap in a contest with a Turing machine.
In view of this asymmetry, result (2), above, is weaker than it may at first appear. (It is because of the absence of a precision requirement, of course, that M2 is able to compute a function E(x,y) that can neither be computed nor approximated by a Turing machine, in apparent contradiction to Pour-El's result.)
The Shannon Pour-El theorem is of no more help than a crystal ball to someone who would like to know whether or not analogue machines that can compute Uncomputable functions may some day be built, or whether the human brain may contain such mechanisms. For the GPAC is an idealisation of a museum piece. Its horizons were set by the state of the art of electromechanical engineering at the time at which Shannon wrote. If new black boxes are added to perform primitive operations foreign to the differential analyser then by definition the resulting machine is not a GPAC and so falls outside the ambit of the theorem.
any convenient block of squares on its tape, using occurrences of the marker symbol to indicate the beginning and the end of the input string. As soon as an instruction in the machine's program puts the machine into state χ, the input is delivered to the oracle and the oracle returns the value of the function. Doyle 1982 , Kreisel 1967 , 1974 , Pour-El 1974 , Pour-El and Richards 1979 , 1981 , Penrose 1989 , 1994 , Scarpellini 1963 , Stannett 1990 , Vergis et al. 1986 ; Copeland and Sylvan 1997 is a survey).
A notional oracle can certainly be implemented by means of a machine similar to M1. For example, relative to some given ordering of the arguments of the halting function, the successive values of the function form a certain infinite sequence of binary digits. Let this sequence be preceded by a decimal point. Some quantity of charge physically instantiates the real number so formed. Given some subdevices for performing appropriate arithmetical operations, values of the halting function can be extracted on demand from an accumulator storing exactly that quantity of charge.
The mechanism implementing an oracle need not employ a continuously-valued physical magnitude. It may be discrete, in the sense that the action of the mechanism can always be described by enumerating some sequence S 1 , S 2 , ... of states of the mechanism, where each of the totality of possible states of the mechanism is uniquely labelled by an integer. (The action of M1, for example, cannot be so described, for M1 has more possible states than there are integers.) Gandy (1980) has proved that any discrete mechanism satisfying certain rather general 'principles' can be perfectly simulated by a Turing machine. So if an oracle is to be implemented by a discrete mechanism, it must be a mechanism that contravenes one or more of these principles. As Gandy points out (1980: 145) , there are notional machines obeying Newtonian mechanics that contravene the principles, for example ones employing instantaneous action at a distance, or signals travelling with arbitrarily large velocities, so that the distance a signal can travel during a single step of the machine's operation is unbounded. However, these restrictions are in a way arbitrary, and the notion of an O-machine can readily be generalised so that no function on the integers remains uncomputable. This gives rise to an obvious objection, namely that the attempt to broaden the concept of computability has ended with the concept becoming trivialised, for if each function on the integers is computable by some machine or other, the expression 'computable function on the integers' becomes synonymous with 'any function on the integers whatsoever'. The reply to this objection is straightforward. Computability is a relative notion, not an absolute one. All computation, classical or otherwise, takes place relative to some set or other of primitive capabilities. The primitives specified by Turing in 1936 occupy no privileged position. One may ask whether a function is computable relative to these primitives or to some superset of them. Answers will come in the form of theorems, anything but trivially won, to 'we can depend on there being a Turing machine that captures the functional relations of the brain', for so long as 'these relations between input and output are functionally well-behaved enough to be describable by ... mathematical relationships ... we know that some specific version of a Turing machine will be able to mimic them' (Guttenplan 1994: 595) . These various quotations are typical of current writing on the foundations of the computational theory of mind.
Turing had no result entailing that a Turing machine can 'display any systematic pattern of responses to the environment whatsoever'. Indeed, he had a result entailing the opposite. 1952.) In mathematical logic this is the standard use of the term 'Church-Turing thesis'. However, it is nowadays not uncommon for a very different proposition, that whatever can be calculated by any machine can be computed by a universal Turing machine, to be called 'the Church-Turing thesis' or instructed. Thus, a universal system can become a generally intelligent system' (ibid.). 8 The second occurrence of 'system' in the first of these statements must, of course, be taken to mean 'system whose input-output function can be computed by a Turing machine' (else the statement is false). So if
Newell's brief argument is deductively valid then it has an additional, unstated premiss, namely that a generally intelligent system does not work by means of computing Uncomputable functions (nor work by physical means other than computation that can be computationally simulated only by a machine that computes such functions). Without this additional premiss there is no valid inference from the premiss that Newell does state to the conclusion. Newell believes this additional premiss because he believes, on the basis (as he says) of the work of Turing and Church, that ' there exists a most general formulation of machine', which is to say, of 'the notion of ... determinate physical mechanism', and this general formulation 'leads to a unique set of input-output functions ' (1980: 150) . This 'maximal set of functions' is, he says, the set of Turing-machine-computable functions; the members of this set are 'the functions that can be attained by ... machines' or determinate physical systems (ibid.). His allusion to the work of Turing and Church is all that Newell provides by way of support for these claims. But, again, the mathematical treatment by Turing and Church of the notion of an effective procedure affords no clue as to the truth-value of the empirical conjecture that there are no naturally occurring systems whose 'input-output functions' cannot be simulated by any Turing machine (and nor do Turing and Church suggest that it does).
Dennett endorses a related argument (1978: 82-3 ). His conclusion is that AI (conceived of as a project involving only classical computation) is 'the study of all possible modes of intelligence ' (1978: 83) . The argument is, he says, an argument from 'some version of Church's Thesis (e.g. anything computable is Turing-machine computable)' (ibid.).
[A] non-question-begging psychology will be a psychology that makes no ultimate appeals to unexplained intelligence, and that condition can be reformulated as the condition that whatever functional parts a psychology breaks its subjects into, the smallest, or most fundamental, or least sophisticated parts must not be supposed to perform tasks or follow procedures requiring intelligence. (1984: 96-7.) This is a sound observation. However, later on the very same page is a remark certain to encourage the very tendency that Pylyshyn is complaining about:
The most primitive machine architecture is, no doubt, the original binary-coded Turing machine introduced by Alan Turing ... Turing's machine is 'universal' in the sense that it can be programmed to compute any computable function. 9 (1984: 97.) In similar fashion Boden unwittingly sets the terms of computational psychology in such a way as to exclude any consideration of the possibility of studying architectures that are not Turing-machineequivalent. In computational psychology, she tells her readers, 'the mind is conceived of in terms of the computational properties of universal Turing machines' (1988: 5) . Then later: 'If a psychological science is possible at all, it must be capable of being expressed in [classical] computational terms' (1988: 259) . She offers this claim as a consequence of Turing's having 'proved that a language capable of defining "effective procedures" suffices, in principle, to solve any computable problem' (ibid.). Turing proved no such thing.
The Church-Turing thesis improperly so called, which is a dogma rooted in a misconstrual of Turing's work, is an unexamined assumption of much contemporary writing on the mind. Its promulgation by leading theoreticians has assisted in blotting out a significant category of possible models of human cognition. Until some models in this category are actually constructed and studied we have no way of knowing how fruitful such research may be. 10 NOTES 1. For ease I have omitted to describe how the decimal point is to be dealt with. If the decimal representation of y, but not of x, can be calculated by a program that terminates, then once all significant digits of y's representation are exhausted, the machine proceeds to add 0 to each remaining digit of x's representation.
2. The term 'sequencing' should not be taken to imply a linear mode of operation. The sequence of operations may consist of cycles of parallel activity.
